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include requests by the United States and the European Community, where deregulation measures
were extensively implemented in order to facilitate these countries’ enterprises access into Japan’s
market. Internal factors include the necessity for the privatization of state or public corporations
in order to utilize private initiative to its fullest extent and for the reduction of differences between
domestic and international prices.
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INTRODUCTION
Deregulation in Japan has been caused by both external
and internal factors. External factors include requests by the
United States and the European Community, where deregula-
tion measures were extensively implemented in order to facili-
tate these countries' enterprises access into Japan's market. In-
ternal factors include the necessity for the privatization of state
or public corporations in order to utilize private initiative to its
fullest extent and for the reduction of differences between do-
mestic and international prices.
Deregulation in Japan was first implemented in 1967 as a
way of reducing governmental approval. During the period be-
tween fiscal year (or "FY") 1981 and FY 1986, the emphasis of
deregulation was put mainly on the reduction of the people's
burden, simplification of administrative process, and promotion
of private initiative. During the period between FY 1987 to FY
1994, deregulation was also aimed at the enrichment of people's
lives, transformation of industrial structure, improvement of
market access, creation and enlargement of new enterprises, and
the reduction of differences between domestic and foreign
prices. During the period between FY 1995 and FY 1998, the
objectives of the deregulation program taken by the Japanese
Government were to transform its national socioeconomic sys-
tem into one that is internationally open, free, fair, founded
upon the principle of market mechanism and individual ac-
countability, and to replace the administrative process of prior
supervision with one of an ex-post facto checking system.
In April 1997, the Japanese Agency for Economic Planning
("Agency") estimated the economic effect of recent deregulation
measures taken by the Japanese Government during the period
between FY 1990 and FY 1995.1 For the effect of deregulation
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1. MINISTRY OF PoSTs AND TELECOMMUNICATION, FiscA. YEAR 1997 ANNUAL REPORT
ON DEREGULATION 36-40 (1998).
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measures on the market, the Agency defines the effects of en-
largement of consumption and facilities investment resulted
from deregulation measures as demand effect. Demand effect is
estimated to be as large as Y7.2 trillion annually on average-the
average being the ratio over nominal GDP, 1.55%-in determin-
ing the effect in the market of telecommunications, distribution,
land and housing, airlines, and local beer manufacturers. The
effect of these deregulation measures is rather large and as fol-
lows:
" Demand effect by the increase of new large scale retail
stores following from deregulation of the Large Scale Re-
tail Store Act ("LSRSA") 2 is estimated to be Y4.5 trillion
annually on average. On the other hand, established
small-medium retail stores suffered from a loss of sales of
Y600 billion annually on average because of the entry of
new large-scale stores. On balance, demand effect by de-
regulation of the LSRSA turns out to be Y3.6 trillion.
* The demand effect by the abrupt diffusion of mobile
phones and cable television resulting from deregulation
of telecommunications is estimated to be V2.1 trillion an-
nually on average. Demand effect by the spread of broad
spectrum television broadcasting is also estimated to be
Y200 billion annually on average. Demand effect by de-
regulation is estimated to be Y700 billion in convertible
bonds, Y190 billion in land and housing, Y100 billion in
dispatching personnel, Y72 billion in airlines, and Y16 bil-
lion in local beer.
As for the effect of deregulation on consumer benefits, the
Agency defines the demand figure multiplied by the difference
between the hypothetical price level in case of non-deregulation
and real price level as consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is
estimated to be as high as Y4.6 trillion annually on average-the
ratio over nominal GDP, 0.98%, which indicates that the benefi-
ciary burden (including enterprises) is reduced by 0.98% of
their income-in the market of telecommunications, alcoholic
distribution, cosmetics, and medicine, and the overhauling of
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Large Store Retail Store Act (visited Sept.
16, 1999) <http://www.infojapan.org/region/n-america/us/economy/date/
dereg9805.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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automobiles, airlines, petroleum products, electricity, and gas.
The merit, of which is rather high, is as follows:
" Consumer surplus resulting from charges reduced by
more than seventy percent, compared with those in 1985
in domestic and international telecommunications and
mobile phones, is the highest. It is Y1.2 trillion annually
on average during the period between FY 1990 and FY
1995.
" Consumer surplus resulting from charges in electricity
was reduced by 6.29% through method calculating
charges on the basis that efficiency is estimated to be Y1
trillion annually on average during the period between FY
1995 and FY 1996.
* Consumer surplus from the reduced price of gasoline re-
sulting from liberalization of imports of petroleum prod-
ucts is Y900 billion annually on average during the period
between FY 1994 and FY 1996.
Consumer surplus is estimated to be Y700 billion in convertible
bonds, Y510 billion in overhauling of automobiles, Y140 billion
in alcoholic distribution, Y100 billion in airlines, Y91 billion in
commercial papers, Y48 billion in gas, and Y40 billion in cosmet-
ics and medicine.
The following sections examine in detail the conspicuous
effect of deregulation in both the telecommunications and avia-
tion business.
I. DEREGULATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS BUSINESSES
A. The First Info-Communications Reform
Until FI 1984, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public
Corporation ("NTT") and KDD Co.' had respectively monopo-
lized Japan's domestic and international telecommunications be-
cause of their technological integrity. Technological innova-
tions such as fiber-optic networks and communication satellites,
however, reduced the necessity for technological integrity to be
maintained by each monopolistic corporation. A single corpora-
tion by itself would find difficulty in responding to its users' di-
verse needs. Thus, on April 1, 1985, the Government of Japan
3. KDD Co. is an abbreviation of Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co., which means Inter-
national Telegraph and Telephone Co.
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introduced the principle of competition into the telecommuni-
cations market in order to vitalize the telecommunications busi-
ness and to respond to such diversified needs.
On the one hand, NTT was privatized in response to the
privatization of British Telecom in August 1984. Although NTT
was transformed into a company, it had special status in which
whole shares were held by the government. Although two-thirds
gradually were sold later, the foreign capital ratio would be lim-
ited to one-fifth of its total shares with voting rights, and the res-
olution to appoint directors and auditors became valid only after
approval by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
("MPT"). NTT's activities were deregulated as follows: the prin-
ciple that NTT's tariff and budget had to be approved by the
Diet was abolished; tariff approval by the Diet shifted into tariff
approval by the MPT; and the regulation of NTT's investment
was withdrawn.
On the other hand, the MPT allowed new entry of Type I
carriers that offered services by establishing their own telecom-
munications circuit facilities. A Type I carrier's new entry is sub-
ject to the MPT's approval because of its strong public character-
istics. The MPT's approval standards regulate whether the car-
rier's service supply is appropriate to demand in the service area,
whether their circuit facilities are in excess, and whether their
financial base is solid and their technological ability is enough.
The MPT liberalized circuit usage by Type II carriers that
provide services by leasing telecommunications circuit facilities
from Type I carriers. There exist special and general Type II
carriers. Since special Type II carriers communicate with for-
eigu spots and provide service to many unspecified users, their
entry is subject to registration in order to prevent a possible in-
terruption of telecommunications service due to a system break-
down. As General Type II carriers provide service to specified
persons belonging to the same business group, their entry need
only notification. The MPT also deregulated the policy for the
lease of terminal equipment in order to to permit sales of tele-
phone sets as long as they satisfy certain standard of technology.
B. New Telecommunications Market Entry
By such regulation measures, the number of new Type I car-
riers increased from five in FY 1985 to 142 in FY 1997. Among
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them, the number of mobile carriers markedly increased from
two in FY 1987 to ninety in FY 1996. In FY 1997, the annual sales
of total Type I carriers amounted to Y13.3 trillion, with a growth
rate of 9.6% over the previous year-in contrast with sales de-
creases in other industries. In particular, the growth rate of mo-
bile carriers' sales in FY 1997 was 29.9%. New Type I carriers
occupied a sales share of 50.1%, totaling Y5.9 trillion; in particu-
lar, the mobile carriers' share was 39.7%, while NTIF-an old
Type I carrier-held a share of 47.3%, totaling Y6.3 trillion. The
number of Type II carriers also remarkably increased from 209
in FY 1985 to 5871 in FY 1997, in particular, general Type II
carriers increased from 200 in FY 1985 to 5776 in FY 1997.
International investment in Japan's telecommunications
carriers is spreading. Examples of main Type I carriers and spe-
cial Type II carriers with more than a five percent foreign capital
ratio are shown at Table 2. The foreign capital ratio in Type I
carriers was limited to one-third of their whole shares with voting
rights until February 1998, while there has been no such restric-
tion on Type II carriers. The foreign capital ratio in NTT and
KDD as of March 31, 1998 was only 3.97% and 3.14% respec-
tively due to restrictions on foreign investment in these two
champion companies. Such restriction on KDD, however, was
abolished in July 1998 when KDD was completely privatized.
C. Transition of Type I Carriers' Market Share
In domestic telecommunications, new common carriers
("NCC") occupied a share of only 7.9% of the telephone market
of Y5,211 billion of revenue basis in FY 1996 while NTT held a
market share of as much as 92.1%. In the telephone market,
which totaled 88.23 billion calls in IY 1996, NCCs occupied a
share of 9.5%, while NTT held a 90.5% share. Total calls con-
sisted of 69.4 billion intra-prefectural calls, which was 78.7% of
the total market and 18.83 billion inter-prefectural calls. In the
market of inter-prefectural calls, NCCs occupied as much as a
35.6% share, while NTT held a 64.4% share. The NCCs' share
of the same market remarkably increased from 22.4% in FY 1991
to 35.6% in FY 1996, while its market share of total calls slightly
increased from 4.7% in FY 1991 to 9.5% in IY 1996.
In the leased circuit market of Y621 billion in revenue basis
in FY 1996, NCCs occupied a seventeen percent share, while
S492000]
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Table Two: Examples of Main Foreign Investment in Japan's
Telecommunication Carriers (As of 31 May, 1998)
(1) Type I Telecommunications Carriers
Carriers Major Foreign Investors
DDI Corp.
International Digital Communications, Inc.
TU-KA Cellular Tokyo, Inc.
Tokyo Digital Phone Co., Ltd.




State Street Bank and Trust Co. etc.
Cable & Wireless plc ("C&W"),
Air Touch International,
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
BT Holdings, GTE Corp., etc.
Air Touch International, C&W
C&W, Nextel Communications
GTE Corp., Mannesmann Eurocom,
Bell Canada International
MCI WorldCom, Inc.
(2) Special Type II Telecommunications Carriers
Carriers Major Foreign Investors
AT&T Jens Corp.
BT Network Information Service
IBM Japan Services Business
Information Services International-
Dentsu, Ltd.




Saturn Global Network Service Co., Ltd.
Asia Internet Holding Co., Ltd. (Singapore)
AOL Japan, Inc.
GAINS JAPAN Co., Ltd.
Trans Pacific Telecom K.K.
Teleglobe Services Japan, Inc. Corp.
TPC, Inc.
AT&T Corp.
British Telecom plc (UK) Co. Ltd.
IBM WTC Co., Ltd.
GE Information Service
Cable & Wireless plc Communications
Services Ltd.
Deutsche Telekom AG
Telstra Corp., Ltd. (Australia)
Calcom (Israel)
Saturn Global Service Japan Europe
Pacific Internet Super Net
(Hong Kong)
America Online, Inc. (USA)
Tullett & Tokyo Forex Europe B.V.
(the Netherlands)
Trans Pacific Telecom Ltd. (UK)
Teleglobe International (USA)
The Phone Co. (USA)
Source: MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, OUTLINE OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
BUsINESS IN JAPAN 5-6 (June 1999).
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NTT held a share of eighty-three percent. In the Y2,307 billion
cellular phone market in the same fiscal year, NCCs occupied a
44.7% share, while NTT held a share of 55.3%. In the Y267 bil-
lion radio paging market, in the same fiscal year, NCCs also oc-
cupied a 39.7% share, while NTT held a 60.3% share. Thus,
NCCs' share in the market of inter-prefectural calls, cellular
phone, and radio paging conspicuously increased, but NTT still
maintained a majority share in the domestic telecommunica-
tions market.
Due to the deregulation measures of international telecom-
munications, Japan Telecom Ltd. Co. and International Digital
Communications, Inc. entered this market. In the entire inter-
national telecommunications market of Y467 billion in revenue
basis in FY 1996, NCCs occupied a thirty-two percent share while
KDD held a sixty-eight percent share. In the Y400 billion inter-
national telephone market of the same fiscal year, NCCs occu-
pied a share of thirty-four percent, while KDD held a sixty-six
percent share. In the international leased circuit market of Y31
billion in the same fiscal year, NCCs occupied a thirty-one per-
cent share, while KDD held a sixty-nine percent share.4 Thus,
NCCs' share in the international telecommunications market re-
markably increased, but KDD still maintained a majority share.
D. Reduction of Charges
While charges by Type I carriers are subject to the MPT's
approval, special Type II carriers need only notification-and
even notification is not necessary to general Type II carriers.
The NTT's charge for a long distance telephone call between
Tokyo and Osaka, a distance of 500 km, for three minutes dur-
ing weekly daytime hours was reduced by 77.5%, from Y400 on
April 1, 1985 to ¥90 on February 1, 1998. NCC charges the same
rate. On the other hand, the Tokyo Telecommunication Net-
work's charge was as low as Y63 on March 1, 1998.
The KDD's charge for an international direct dial call be-
tween Japan and the United States for three minutes during day-
time weekly hours was reduced by 70.6% from Y1,530 on April 1,
1985 to Y450 on November 23, 1996. NCC's charge is slightly
4. MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, OUTLINE OF THE TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS BUSINESS IN JAPAN, (June 1999) <http://www.mpt.go.jp/whatsnow/yellowbook/
index.html> (on file the Fordham International Law Journal).
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lower at Y440. The NTT's charge of leased circuit service, 64
kbps between Tokyo and Osaka, was reduced by 84.6% from
Y1,100,000 on April 1, 1985 to Y169,500 on September 1, 1995.
The same charge for long-distance NCCs and regional NCCs,
which use NTT's leased circuit-a maximum fifteen kilometers
at both end of the NCC's leased circuit-was lower by Y165,500
on June 1, 1998 and Y138,000 on October 1, 1996, respectively.
The NTT's monthly basic charge for cellular phones was re-
duced by seventy-eight percent, from Y30,000 on April 1, 1985 to
Y6600 for analog on June 1, 1997, and as low as Y4900 for 800
MHz digital. The NCCs' same charge is even lower, Y4600 for
analog and Y4500 for digital on June 1, 1997.5
As indicated above, since April 1, 1985 until August 1998,
more than 6000 new carriers have entered into the telecommu-
nications market with the result being reduced charges by more
than seventy percent compared with those in 1985 through pro-
motion of competition in domestic and international telecom-
munications.
E. Facilities Investment
In FY 1996, Type I carriers' facilities investment amounted
to Y4.1 trillion with a growth rate of 24.5% over the previous
year. Both new and old Type I carriers incidentally hold an
equal fifty percent share in the amount. In particular, mobile
communicators occupy a 38.8% share, and NTT a 48.4% share
of Y1.991 trillion. Indeed, the facilities investment amount of
Y1.594 trillion by mobile communicators, which had surpassed
the investment amount of the steel and iron industry in IFY 1995,
in FY 1996 surpassed that of the automobile industry, which is
Japan's basic industry. This fact symbolically indicates the good
result of deregulation in telecommunications.
F. Outstanding Expansion of Mobile Phone Market
While the growth rate for fixed telephone subscriptions in-
creased from 46,771,699 in March 1987 to 61,244,213 in Septem-
ber 1997, the growth rate for mobile phone subscriptions in-
creased dramatically from 95,131 in March 1987 to 41,446,615 in
July 1998. While the former decreased by one percent over the
5. Id. at 8.
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previous year, the latter increased by forty-three percent over the
same period. In the transition of the mobile phone market,
NTT started their service in December 1979, separated Mobile
Communications Network, Inc. from its Head Office in July
1992, and Mobile subsequently split into nine regional compa-
nies in July 1993. NCCs and Personal Handy-phone System car-
riers ("PHS") entered this market in December 1988 and July
1995 respectively. The outstanding expansion of the mobile
phone market resulted from competition among the four digital
mobile carriers in each regional block and diversification of ter-
minal equipment following from adoption of customer owned
and maintained systems-in April 1994, down-sized, weight-re-
duced, and low-priced terminals, and the reduction of charges.
In the mobile phone market as of July 31, 1998, cellular phones
occupied an 84.4% share while PHS held a 15.6% share. While
NCC held a 51.6% share of cellular phones in FY 1995, they only
occupied a 43.2% share in July 1998. The shift of mobile phone
charges from the approval system to the prior notification system
in December 1996 has contributed to elastic pricing and reduc-
tion of charges.
The current profit of NTT DoCoMo Co., which consists of
nine regional mobile subsidiaries, totaled Y364 billion in March
1999, and will be expected to surpass the profit of NTT itself by
as much as Y285 billion.6 It symbolically indicates how much
faster the mobile phone market is growing than the fixed phone
market.
II. The Second Info-Communications Reform
The Second Info-Communications Reform consists of de-
regulation, the promotion of network interconnection, and
NTIT's reorganization.7
A. Deregulation
The MPT is implementing the items listed in the Three Year
Program for the Promotion of Deregulations' determined at the
6. See Nippon Economic Newspaper, (visited on Sept. 22, 1999) <http://
www.nni.nikkei.co.jp> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
7. MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 4, 12-15.
8. See MINISTRY OF POSTs AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, THREE YEAR PROGRAM FOR THE
PROMOTION OF DEREGULATIONS (1997).
COMPETITION IN JAPAN
cabinet meeting held on March 31, 1998, and is continuing to
review the regulations for promoting Japan's socioeconomic
structural reform. One area the MPT has focused on is the de-
regulation of telecommunications charges. The requirement for
authorization of end-user charges will be abolished and re-
placed, in principle, by a notification system. The MPT may or-
der to change notified charges with a view of maintaining appro-
priateness if the calculation method of charges is not appropri-
ately and precisely provided, unjustifiably discriminatory to
certain persons, against users' interests because they would cause
unfair competition with other telecommunications carriers, or
considered inappropriate in light of their socioeconomic situa-
tion.
A price cap regulation will be applied to end-user charges
for basic services, including subscriber telephone service in the
regional telecommunications market where full-scale competi-
tion does not work. Under this regulation, the MPT can set fea-
sible charges as an index to basic charges in light of appropriate
costs, commodity prices, and other economic situations. In con-
trast, the KDD Co., Ltd. Law was abolished in July 1998 and KDD
is now completely privatized.
The MPT also wishes to maintain regulations on the inter-
connection of networks. To maintain the transparency of the
conditions for interconnection and to promote various forms of
interconnection between telecommunications carriers, improve-
ments will continue to be made in accordance with the report on
the Basic Rules for Interconnection submitted by the Telecom-
munications Council in December 1996. The entire system will
be reviewed toward the end of FY 2000.
There has been recent deregulation in the telecommunica-
tions field. A bill to repeal the clause on prevention of excess
facilities9 was passed by the Diet in June 1997. This revision was
enacted in November 1997 following the preparation of related
ministerial ordinances. Also, full-scale liberalization of leased
circuit usage has been implemented. For example, the intercon-
nection of both ends of domestic leased circuits with public
switched networks for voice services was fully liberalized in Octo-
ber 1996. International Internet telephone services were liberal-
ized in August 1997. The provision of basic voice services
9. Article 10(i) and (ii) of the Telecommunications Business Law.
2000] S55
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through the interconnection of both ends of international
leased circuits with public switch networks was made possible in
December 1997.
Restrictions on foreign capital investment have also been
lifted. In line with the agreement reached at the World Trade
Organization negotiations in February 1997, the Diet passed bills
to revise the Telecommunications Business Law and the Radio
Law in June 1997. The new laws removed all limitations on for-
eign investment in Type I telecommunications carriers, includ-
ing those for radio station licenses, except for NTT and KDD.
The revised clauses were enforced in February 1998, after the
enactment of the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services.10
In October 1997, a blanket licensing system was introduced
to make it unnecessary for applicants to obtain individual
licenses for each mobile specified radio station. Applicants are
permitted to establish more than one radio station of the same
type with a single blanket license. The transborder use of over-
seas mobile specified radio stations is authorized if the blanket
license holder has an additional operational permission.
The MPT has made efforts to maintain the transparency of
their regulations.11 In compliance with the Examination Stan-
dards Regarding the Telecommunications Business Law and the
Examination Standards Regarding the Radio Law instituted in
September 1994, the MPT processes applications for permission,
as required by the related laws, within the standard processing
period.
B. Promotion of Interconnection Policies
The Telecommunications Council reported on the Basic
Rules for Interconnection 2 to the MPT in December 1996. Tak-
10. General Agreement of Trade in Services, in Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994).
11. See MINISTRY OF PosTs AND COMMUNICATIONS, MANUAL FOR MARKET ENTRY INTo
JAPANESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS BUSINESS (Mar. 1999) (containing official announce-
ment of "Declaration of Standard Tariff for Radio Paging" published in "Official Gov-
ernment Gazette").
12. For Type I telecommunications carriers that own designated facilities-fixed
local loop facilities in excess of the total number of subscriber lines at prefectural levels
and intraprefectural telecommunications facilities installed as one system with those
local loop facilities-the following obligations are imposed:
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ing this into account, a bill of amendments, including the provi-
sion of the Basic Rules for Interconnection to the Telecommuni-
cations Business Law ("Rules") was passed by the Diet in June
1997, and enacted in November 1997. Upon enactment of the
Rules, NTT filed an application for interconnection tariffs for
designated telecommunications facilities, which was authorized
by the MPT in March 1998.
C. NTT's Reorganization Scheme
Although the NCC's market share in domestic telecommu-
nications remarkably increased by deregulation, NTT still holds
the majority share. Its operating revenue is enormous, totaling
Y8,821 billion in FY 1996 in comparison with AT&T, with Y5,892
billion in revenue, Deutsche Telekom AG with Y4,687 billion,
France Telecom with Y3,332 billion, and British Telecom with
Y2,951 billion. 13 With a view towards further promoting compe-
tition and maintaining fair and effective competition in the tele-
communications market, the Rules were promulgated in which
the NTT was reorganized and split into Eastern NTT Corp.,
Western NTT Corp., and NTT Long-distance Communications
Corp., all under its holding company. 4 The NTT corporations,
to be reorganized by December 22, 1999, would not be in-
dependent like the split AT&T companies. Both Eastern and
Western NTT Corporations are special corporations engaged
mainly in intra-prefectural communications in their respective
regions, and are also obliged to provide universal telephone ser-
vice to all of Japan. Between both companies comparative com-
petition is expected, but not direct competition through enter-
ing the other's market. NTT Long-distance Communications
Corp. is a private company specializing in inter-prefectual com-
" introduction of an interconnection tariff system including interconnection
charges and technical requirements, etc.;
" preparation and disclosure of accounting reports concerning interconnection;
and
" preparation and disclosure of plans to revise or expand facility features or func-
tions.
13. MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 4, at 24. The ex-
change rate to Japanese yen used is the closing rate on January 6, 1997 (US$1 =
Y116.65; DM1 = Y74.29; FF1 = Y21.98; £1 = Y197.61).
14. The holding company will hold all shares of both Eastern and Western NTT.
It will also hold all shares of the NTT Long-distance Communications Company for the
time being.
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munications, but it was permitted to enter the business of inter-
national communications through its affiliates in June 1997.
KDD Co. was also permitted to enter the business of domestic
communications through its affiliates on July 25, 1997. Thus,
competition between NTT and KDD in both domestic and inter-
national telecommunications is expected.
III. Deregulation in the Aviation Business
Until March 1986,Japan Air Lines ('JAL") monopolized Ja-
pan's overseas flights together with some service at domestic ba-
sic routes, while All Nippon Airways ("ANA") engaged in almost
all domestic basic and local routes. Since then, ANA, which oc-
casionally provided overseas chartered service, has entered the
overseas regular aviation market. The number of passengers
transported by these two companies at the route between Tokyo
and Los Angeles increased by twenty-eight percent from 273,000
in FY 1985 to 350,000 in FY 1986, with an increase in share from
32.7% to 36.6%.' 5 As of September 1996, both JAL and ANA
competed at twenty-eight overseas air routes,1 6 for example, be-
tween Tokyo or Osaka and New York, Los Angeles, Washington,
D.C., London, Paris, Frankfurt, Beijing, or Sydney. Both JAL
and Japan Air System ('JAS") also compete in the route between
Tokyo and Seoul. 7 Competition between Japanese airline com-
panies in their overseas air routes has contributed to increase
the number of passengers transported by them and an increase
of their shares.'"
Since July 1986, double tracking and triple tracking has
been vigorously implemented in domestic air routes as well.
From FY 1986 to FY 1996, it was accomplished in forty-two
15. MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION, FISCAL YEAR 1987 ANNUAL REPORT OF TRANSPOR-
TATION 161 (1988).
16. MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION, FIScAL YEAR 1996 ANNUAL REPORT OF TRANSPOR-
TATION 358 (1997).
17. As of August 1992 and 1993, threeJapanese airlines-Japan Air Lines, All Nip-
pon Airways, Japan Air System-competed for a route between Tokyo and Seoul, and
between Tokyo and Singapore. See MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION, FISCAL YFAR 1992 AN-
NUAL REPORT OF TRANSPORTATION 251 (1992); MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION, FISCAL
YEAR 1993 ANNUAL REPORT OF TRANSPORTATION 253 (1993).
18. The number of passengers transported by these two companies between Tokyo
and Hong Kong increased by 31.5% from 540,000 in FY 1986 to 710,000 in FY 1987,
with an increase in share from 36.2% to 39.9%. See MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION, FIS-
CAL YEAR 1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF TRANSPORTATION 332 (1998).
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routes, in particular, thirty-three routes from FY 1991. Of the
twenty-four air routes that changed to double tracking and triple
tracking from April 1991 to April 1996, sixteen routes saw a
higher rate of increase during the previous three years. In re-
sponse to intensified competition, airline companies began to
cancel or reduce flights on unprofitable routes while increasing
the number of flights on competitive routes.
In order to respond to the diversified need of users, the
Ministry of Transportation ("MOT") replaced the approval sys-
tem of fifty percent discount fares with the notification system in
December 1994. Airline companies introduced a maximum
thirty-six percent discount fare system for purchases made more
than twenty-eight days in advance for domestic airline tickets in
May 1995, and implemented a fare range system in May and
June 1996. These systems have accelerated the diversification of
fares. In 1996, following the adoption of a fare range system, a
large portion of demand shifted from August, when fares are
higher because of larger numbers of passengers, to July and Sep-
tember. More than forty percent of users replied that airfares
seem cheaper and it is easier to travel by air due to discount
fares. 9
In December 1996, the MOT decided to abolish, in princi-
ple, the regulation on supply-demand control concerning the
transport business. On the basis of this policy, it permitted the
new entry of Skymark Airlines Co. 20 on the route between Tokyo
and Fukuoka in Southern Japan on December 19, 1998 and Air
Do Co. 21 on the route between Tokyo and Sapporo in Northern
Japan on December 20, 1998. These new entries into the domes-
tic aviation market were the first in thirty-five years. Both compa-
nies have a small amount of capital, which provides for only
three flights per day by only one leased airplane, yet they charge
a fifty percent reduced fare. The MOT permitted these reduced
fares by assuming that they would not become predatory in pric-
ing because of their small share of the market, only eight per-
cent, and similarly reduced fares taken by the three other airline
companies. Such new entries will promote further competition
in the aviation market.
19. MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION, FiscAL YEAR 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF TRANsPOR-
TATION 38-42 (1997).
20. This company was established by a Japanese travel agency called H.I.S.
21. People in Hokkaido established it in order to vitalize their economy.
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